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ABSTRACT 
 
The development of business laws in key markets have not kept pace with the 
exponential growth of foreign investment they have experienced. Countries such as 
Brazil, Russia and China, either do not consider the issue of cross-border insolvency in 
their legislation or they explicitly provide for a ‘territorialist’ approach to cross-border 
insolvency proceedings, whereby each country grabs local assets for the benefit of local 
creditors, with little consideration of foreign proceedings. This has led to uncoordinated, 
expensive attempts at cross-border reorganisation.  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) was adopted with the 
objective of modernizing international insolvency regimes and enhancing cross-border 
cooperation. In its 19 years of existence, it has been adopted by 41 countries in a total of 
43 jurisdictions but by none of the BRIC states or the ‘Next-11’ nations of Bangladesh 
and Pakistan. While it has entered into policy-level discussion in China, India and 
Russia, it would seem that there is still scepticism regarding the efficacy and suitability 
of the Model Law for adoption into their national systems. This paper seeks to establish 
whether the Model Law can adequately plug, what Steven Kargman calls, ‘the glaring 
gap in the international insolvency architecture’, looking particularly at the context of 
the South Asian states of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. It will question whether its 
adoption will improve the ability of these jurisdictions to handle the challenges of cross-
border insolvencies, especially in light of their existing legal landscape, their market 
policy objectives and the existing alternatives available to the Model Law.  
 
  
Are Bangladesh, India and Pakistan ready to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency? 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2015, the World Bank reported that South Asia is the geographical region 
experiencing the fastest economic growth rate in the world.
1
 Bolstered by low oil prices, 
increased capital inflows and low rates of inflation, the economies of countries like 
India are booming. Along with the four other BRICS nations, they account for over 
15% of world trade (US$ 5.9 trillion).
2
 Corporations of Indian origin, like Tata and 
Reliance, now operate globally in the energy, mineral, oil, gas, manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors.
3
 At the same time, India is a 9
th
 largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment, amounting to US$ 34 billion in 2015.
4
 Pakistan and Bangladesh are 
growing emerging markets for foreign investors and are significant participants in 
global trade.
5
 This is evidenced by the fact that as of July 2016, Pakistan has a GDP of 
US$ 269.97 billion and Bangladesh of US$ 195.08 billion.
6
 Even in the wake of the 
Rana Plaza disaster, Bangladesh continues to enjoy the status of being the 2
nd
 largest 
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exporter of ready-made garments in the world
7
 and is home to a ‘surging consumer 
market’.8 
 
Part of the reason behind this economic growth and integration into the global economy 
is a series of business and investment-oriented legal reforms undertaken by the 
governments of these countries. However, these recent reforms have not kept pace with 
international developments regarding cross-border insolvency, a phenomenon of great 
importance in the aftermath of the recent global recession and the collapse of 
multinational groups like Lehman Brothers. 
 
When Lehman Brothers became bankrupt in 2008, its assets had to not only be 
liquidated in the USA and Europe but also as far afield as Singapore and Hong Kong. 
As a result of the global financial crisis, Brazil saw a drop of 32% in the value of its 
currency within one month,
9
 Russia experienced a volatile housing market,
10
 China 
required a US$ 586 billion fiscal stimulation package
11
 and South Africa recorded a 
47% rise in company failures.
12
 More recently, in June 2015, stock markets in China 
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lost roughly a third of their value in a matter of weeks
13
 and in July 2015, Moscow 
reported that Russia’s GDP had slumped by 4.6%, miring the country deeper in 
recession.
14
 In September 2015, Standard and Poor’s rating agency downgraded Brazil’s 
sovereign debt to “junk” status, highlighting the extent of its ongoing recession.15 The 
slowdown of these economies has adversely impacted countries around the world, from 
Germany to Kazakhstan to Peru, as their exports are reliant on demand from these major 
markets.
16
 This is the natural result of an integrated world economy where there is 
increasing foreign investment in BRIC nations and emerging and frontier markets, 
increasing South-South trade and multi-nationalization of their companies. 
 
It would have been expected that as a corollary to these contemporary economic 
developments, a transnational
17
 insolvency law framework would emerge, in the event 
that some of these businesses or investments fail. This would, inter alia, address issues 
such as the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and coordination between 
courts. However, even a cursory analysis of the literature on cross-border insolvency in 
these countries reveals that they either do not consider the issue of cross-border 
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 In this paper, I use the term ‘transnational’ law as opposed to international law since it is wider in scope 
than public international law or state-centric private international law. It includes the growing corpus of 
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insolvency in their national legislation at all or they explicitly provide for a 
‘territorialist’ approach to cross-border insolvency proceedings, whereby each country 
grabs local assets for the benefit of local creditors, with little consideration of foreign 
proceedings. Conversely, some of these states claim extra-territorial effect for their own 
insolvency proceedings without according the same recognition to in-bound 
proceedings. This has led to inadequate and uncoordinated attempts at cross-border 
insolvency that are expensive and time-consuming.   
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) (hereinafter 
‘UNCITRAL Model Law’) was developed to address these procedural shortcomings in 
the international insolvency architecture and has emerged as the most widely used 
‘framework’ to develop the cross-border aspects of national insolvency regimes. It was 
promulgated by UNCITRAL, the UN body tasked with the reform of international trade 
law, with the goals of enhancing cooperation between the actors in cross-border 
insolvency, promoting legal certainty in trade and investment, ensuring the fair and 
efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies, protecting debtors’ assets and 
rescuing businesses. To that effect, the Model Law facilitates the recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings, the access of foreign representatives, the availability of relief 
for foreign parties and the creation of avenues of cooperation and coordination between 
courts and proceedings. It has been, as of writing, adopted in some form by 41 countries 
in a total of 43 jurisdictions, encompassing a wide spread of OECD, emerging and 
frontier markets.
18
 In 2015 alone, the Members of Organisation pour l' Harmonisation 
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 UNCITRAL, ‘Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’ (UNCITRAL, April 
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en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA)
19
 - representing a bloc of 17 West and 
Central African states – as well as Kenya 20  and Malawi 21  adopted legislation 
incorporating the Model Law. However, none of the key markets of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China or the Next-11 nations of Bangladesh and Pakistan have adopted the 
Model Law. This indicates that there is still scepticism regarding the efficacy of the 
Model Law and considerable weariness about adopting it, even though it has entered 
into policy-level discussion in countries like India and China.  
 
This paper questions whether the UNCITRAL Model Law can adequately plug, what 
Steven Kargman calls, ‘the glaring gap in the international insolvency architecture’,22 
looking particularly at the context of the South Asian states of India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.  It will interrogate the presumption that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency will improve the ability of emerging, common law jurisdictions, like 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, to handle the challenges of cross-border insolvencies, 
especially in light of these countries’ existing legal landscape, their market policy 
objectives and the existing alternatives available to the Model Law. 
 
The second section of this article will provide an overview of the motivations that exist 
for establishing a transnational insolvency law framework. The third section will 
analyse the problems that a lack of a solid cross-border insolvency regime has had on 
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Brazil, Russia and China and how they have responded to such a challenge. These three 
countries have been selected for study because they represent a powerful geopolitical 
bloc that act as the ‘voice’ of emerging economies in international policy forums and 
are seen to act as a counterweight to the interests of OECD countries. The fourth section 
will outline the international insolvency regimes of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as 
of September 2016.  
 
To establish whether adopting the Model law will be the best way to handle cross-
border insolvencies, two older forms of cross-border insolvency regime will be 
surveyed in the fifth section: customised cross-border insolvency regimes 
(CBIAs)/protocols and regional cross-border insolvency agreements. The sixth section 
will be devoted to the drafting process of the Model Law and a summary of its final 
provisions. This will be followed in the seventh section with an analytical and empirical 
study of select common law jurisdictions that have incorporated the Model Law, 
namely, the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and South Africa. The final section will 
evaluate the prospects and challenges of adopting the Model Law in South Asia.  
 
2. The Allure of a Solid, Transnational Insolvency Law Framework 
There have long been attempts to develop norms for transnational insolvency – from 
multilateral agreements between Italian city states in the Middle Ages
23
 to the 
enactment of bilateral treaties between European states for the reciprocal recognition of 
judgments, equal treatment of creditors and enforcement of bankruptcy decrees in the 
                                                 
23
 Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law Part I: Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
vol. X of Wessels Insolvency Law (4
th
edn, Wolters Kluwer 2015) paragraph 10032. 
1700s.
24
 Outside of Europe, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay entered into the 
Treaty of Montevideo on 12 March 1889, which helped parties ascertain a debtor’s 
domicile and entrenched the unitary nature of cross-border proceedings. 
 
A solid, procedural framework is seen as being potentially invaluable as it can help 
lower transaction costs by allowing liquidators to efficiently reach assets, improve 
recovery rates, assist in the rescue of companies, enhance market confidence, stymie 
conflict between the parties involved and generally ensure efficiency and fairness in 
administering claims. This is particularly apparent during periods when global stock 
markets are in distress or amidst a recession.  
 
These benefits have been touted by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank since the 
late 1990s following the onset of the Asian financial crisis. The recession caused 
developing countries like Indonesia to suffer a devaluation of their national currency 
and drainage of their foreign exchange reserve, thereby rendering them dependent on 
loans from IFIs. This, in turn, gave IFIs substantial influence over national policy on 
issues such as insolvency law reform.
25
 
 
IFIs actively encouraged insolvency law reform and legal institution-building on a 
global scale, with the belief that tiding through such crises will require the creation of 
an ‘international financial architecture that is fully grounded on globally authorized 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g. Article 13, the Treaty of Alliance of 9 May 1715 between France and the Catholic Swiss 
Cantons; the Helvetic Convention of 29 May 1777 ; Article 12, Treaty between France and the Helvetic 
Republic of 19 August 1798. 
25
 Terence C. Halliday, ‘Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the 
Reconstruction of States in East Asia’, (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 265, 289. 
national legal systems’. 26  A G-22 report stressed the need for a strong insolvency 
regime to avert financial crises and a subsequent report by the World Bank added that 
courts will be central to a strong insolvency regime.
27
 At the time, the ADB established 
a standard by which the insolvency regimes of 11 Asian countries could be compared 
and the World Bank developed ‘principles and guidelines’ for effective insolvency law 
regimes, which included assessing the cross-border aspects of individual legal systems. 
The economic rationale for developing a cross-border insolvency mechanism was 
emphasised, indicating how a collective, coordinated approach would help rescue 
struggling debtors, prevent discrimination among creditors and maximize creditor 
returns.
28
 
 
These factors have generated political interest in the insolvency reform process, as 
demonstrated by the active participation of Asian governments in forums on insolvency 
law.
29
 In a special session on cross-border insolvency in 2006, it was recognised that 
dealing with the insolvency of multinational corporate groups without an international 
insolvency law framework would be crippling, as debtors would gain possession of the 
group’s assets in individual countries. While there was no consensus on the best way for 
incorporating these features into domestic law, especially given the fragility of the 
insolvency systems of respective jurisdictions, a strong case was made for initial action 
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 Halliday (n 25). 
27
 G-22, Report of the Working Group in International Financial Crises (IMF October 1998); The World 
Bank, East Asia: Recovery and Beyond (The World Bank 2000). 
28
 Michael Sloan, ‘The Lack of Adequate Insolvency Frameworks for Major Corporate Collapses in 
Asia’, in OECD (ed.), Credit Risk and Credit Access in Asia (OECD 2006) 95.  
29
 The OECD, World Bank, Australian Treasury and the Australian Development Bank organised a 
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Systems in Beijing, China in 2006. Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, Singapore, the 
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in this regard to be taken immediately.
30
 Similarly, UNCITRAL Legal Committee 
members stressed the need to improve commercial laws for cross-border transactions 
but highlighted the need for technical assistance to do so.
31
 In theory, this would seem 
to provide fertile ground for the establishment of an international insolvency 
architecture. 
 
However, the construction of such architecture has not yet materialised and the cross-
border insolvency regime of many countries remains inadequate. 
 
3. Illustrative Examples of Gaps in the Transnational Insolvency Law Framework 
Brazil, Russia and China have what can be broadly described as a territorial insolvency 
system, whereby their law seeks to limit the effect of a set of insolvency proceedings to 
its place of origin. This section analyses the problems that have manifested in these 
countries as a result of such an approach. 
 
Russia’s parent bankruptcy law is silent on the recognition of foreign proceedings32 and 
only recognizes foreign judgments regarding insolvency where an international treaty 
exists in this regard between the foreign country and Russia or where there is a 
reciprocal relationship.
33
 Russian courts have not demonstrated great willingness to 
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 OECD, ‘Executive Summary’, in OECD (ed.) Asian Insolvency Systems: Closing the Implementation 
Gap (OECD 2007) 12.  
31
 UN General Assembly, ‘Legal Committee Members Stress Need to Upgrade Commercial Laws for 
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UN General Assembly Press Release GA/L/3274 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gal3274.doc.htm> 
accessed 01 October 2016.   
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 Alexander Trunk, ‘International Insolvency Law in Eastern Europe’ , in Jens Lowitzsch (ed.) The 
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33
 Art 1(6) of the Federal Law No. 127-FZ "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" of 26 October 2002. 
recognize foreign judgments on a reciprocal basis but they have done so on occasion, 
for instance when a decision of a Copenhagen commercial court declaring a Danish 
company insolvent was recognized and enforced by the Russian Supreme Arbitrazh 
Court.
34
 Even with states that Russia has a reciprocal or treaty relationship with, such 
recognition is only afforded to final judgments and interim decisions. Injunctions and 
proceedings are unlikely to be recognized, as evidenced in a Ukrainian bankruptcy case 
where claimants failed to gain recognition in Russia of a moratorium introduced by a 
Ukrainian court.
35
 Russian procedural statues also clarify that public policy will be a 
consideration in recognising foreign judgments, even if a relevant Treaty is in force.
36
 
 
While Brazil has entered into regional agreements with other Latin American countries 
that cover issues of cross-border insolvency, such as provisions for which state’s court a 
creditor can file for bankruptcy
37
 and the recognition of bankruptcy declarations from 
member states,
38
 this has not alleviated the problems Brazil has encountered from the 
growing number of mergers and acquisitions between local and foreign companies 
originating from Europe and the USA. As a general rule, Brazilian courts do not 
recognise foreign insolvency proceedings and do not coordinate and cooperate with 
                                                 
34
 Referred to summarily in Baker & McKenzie, Restructuring & Insolvency Guide for Europe and the 
Middle East (Baker & McKenzie LLP 2011) 150.   
35
 Baker & McKenzie (n 34) 149. 
36
 See Art. 244(1)(7), Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation 2002. 
37
 Article 329, Código de Derecho Internacional Privado (Convention on Private International Law), also 
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courts and insolvency administrators from these states.
39
 This was evidenced in the 
Parmalat Brasil case, where simultaneous insolvency proceedings occurred in several 
jurisdictions including Italy, Ireland, Brazil and the USA. Brazilian courts were required 
to act in concert with foreign courts through an ‘ad hoc coordination of litigation’.40 
However, they failed to do so by not recognising foreign ancillary proceedings and not 
enforcing the ECJ’s Eurofood IFSC case.41 More recently, in 2013, when the OGX 
Group entered insolvency, Brazilian courts allowed local entities to be reorganised but 
not its subsidiaries in Austria
42
 or the Netherlands.
43
  While Brazil treats domestic and 
foreign creditors equally
44
 and conditionally allows for foreign bankruptcy judgments to 
be recognised through exequatur proceedings, this lack of recognition has enabled a 
series of debilitating and costly parallel proceedings.  
 
Faced with these challenges, creditors have had to either file bankruptcy petitions in 
multiple countries or resort to arbitration or mediation.
45
 A number of foreign creditors 
of Brazilian multinational companies have filed debt restructuring plans or recognition 
of ancillary proceedings in the USA. The most prominent example of the latter 
                                                 
39
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(2008) 14 Law & Business Review of the Americas 313, 338.  
40
 The full, unreported decision in Portuguese can be found here: Parmalat Brasil S/A – Indústria de 
Alimentos, Consultor Jurídico, 3 February 2006 <http://www.conjur.com.br/2006-fev-
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43
 Luis Augusto Roux Azevedo and Leandro Araripe Fragoso Bauch, 'Limitations Of Brazilian Law 
Regarding Cross-Border Insolvency' Financier Worldwide Magazine (Birmingham, January 2014) 
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insolvency/#.VjonCrerS73> accessed 1 September 2016. 
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 Bruno K de Oliveira and Joel LT Bastos, ‘Brazil’, in Bruce Leonard (ed.), Getting the Deal Through: 
Restructuring & Insolvency (Law Business Research Ltd 2015) 79.   
45
 Ordélio A Sette and Juliano B Gotlib, ‘Brazil: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law and Policy’, in James R 
Silkenat and Charles D Schmerler (eds), The Law of International Insolvencies and Debt Restructurings 
(OUP 2006) 69.  
concerned the reorganisation of Brazil’s largest airline, Varig S.A., in which a Brazilian 
reorganization was recognized and enforced by a New York court and made binding on 
all the creditors in the US and elsewhere.
46
 In late 2014, another New York court has 
done the same in re Rede Energia SA.
47
 
 
While China also maintains a territorial approach to cross-border insolvency, recent 
legislation and case law indicates a gradual opening up towards foreign insolvency 
proceedings and administrators. Following the enactment of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy 2007 (EBL), China’s insolvency 
proceedings have been given extra-territorial effect, as an acknowledgment of the global 
nature of Chinese business operations and the need to protect Chinese creditors.
48
 There 
is already evidence from Hong Kong courts that some jurisdictions are willing to 
recognise the universal effect of Chinese liquidation proceedings.
49
 However, there are 
considerable restrictions on the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in China. 
Under Article 5 of the EBL, a legally effective, final judgment from a foreign court will 
only be recognised and enforced in China if a number of criteria are satisfied, 
specifically (i) whether there are any international treaties between the foreign country 
and China or whether a relationship of reciprocity exists between them, (ii) whether it 
opposes the basic principles of Chinese law, prejudices state sovereignty, public interest 
or the lawful rights and interests of local creditors. In Hua An Funds v Lehman Brothers 
                                                 
46
 In re Varig S.A. (Viacao Aerea Rio-Grandense), Case No. 05-14400 (Bankr. SDNY, Mar. 19, 2007); 
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47
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48
 Melvin Sng, ‘Cross-border insolvency in the Middle Kingdom’ (2007) 6 Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 348, 349. 
49
 CCIC Finance Limited v. Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp [2005] 2 HKC 589. 
International Europe (LBIE), a Chinese court refused to recognize LBIE’s insolvency 
proceedings that had been opened in the UK on the basis that no treaty or reciprocal 
treatment existed between the UK and China and the court sought to prevent the 
funnelling of assets to benefit off-shore creditors.
50
 On the other hand, Chinese courts 
have accorded recognition to French and Italian proceedings on the basis that a bilateral 
judicial cooperation treaty existed between China and these states.
51
 As of 2013, China 
has entered into civil and commercial judicial assistance treaties/agreements with 32 
countries, often including provisions for cross-border insolvency, but has not recognised 
foreign bankruptcy judgments on the basis of the treaties or Article 5, EBL in recent 
years.
52
 
 
Though the EBL has removed the distinction between domestic and foreign creditors,
53
 
this has not translated smoothly into practice. Foreign investment in China usually 
occurs through offshore holding companies, which remit the investment onshore 
through joint ventures or wholly-owned foreign enterprises in the form of equity. As the 
foreign investor does not take security onshore, the foreign creditor’s rank effectively is 
that of an equity holder and is lower in priority than creditors. During the FerroChina 
reorganization, this discrepancy led a Chinese court to partially distribute FerroChina’s 
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assets to domestic and foreign ‘onshore’ companies, while not allocating any proceeds 
to the offshore holding company or its foreign creditors.
54
 
 
These problems are particularly acute for foreign companies with Chinese subsidiaries 
as, on the one hand, foreign bankruptcy judgments are not recognised, but on the other, 
the existence of an establishment in China has not generally been seen by Chinese 
courts as enough reason to open full insolvency proceedings. As a result of this Catch-
22, foreign creditors and insolvency practitioners have experienced insurmountable 
difficulties in reaching assets located in China. However, there may be some changes to 
Chinese courts’ approach towards foreign insolvency practitioners following a highly 
publicized decision of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China in 
June 2014. In their judgment in Thumb Environmental Technology Group v. Sino-
Environment Technology Group,
55
 a foreign insolvency practitioner was recognised on 
the basis that the internal affairs of a legal person and its wholly-owned branch should 
be determined by the law of the place where the entity is registered (in this case, 
Singapore). This includes the legal rights of the wholly-owned subsidiary and the legal 
capacity of the liquidator appointed by the parent entity.
56
 While considerations of 
Chinese public policy - such as local avoidance rules - remain paramount, optimism has 
been expressed that this approach of ‘bypassing’ the EBL will be the benchmark in 
future cases and represents a mollified stance towards foreign bankruptcy 
administrators. 
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Whether these perceived ‘flaws’ in these countries’ international insolvency regime are 
amended depends on the support such reforms generate among local stakeholders about 
its practical, commercial advantages.
57
  Though professional organisations may call for 
the Model Law to be adopted,
58
 countries like China may view its national interests 
better served by a broadly territorial stance.
59
 
 
4. Cross-Border Insolvency in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
‘In a training course at the Federal Judicial Academy of Pakistan in 2002, 
the 48 participants, all of whom were judges of Banking Courts, were 
asked if they had “ever seen or read a balance sheet or annual report of any 
company”. Only 2 said yes.’60 
 
The above quotation reflects the poor state of insolvency law in South Asia. In fact, 
according to the World Bank’s latest Doing Business report, Pakistan actually fares 
marginally better in resolving domestic insolvency than Bangladesh and India.
61
 While 
the methodology used for these rankings do not explicitly assess the strength of a 
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country’s cross-border insolvency regime, it is unsurprising that these low rankings 
correlate with a poor framework for cross-border insolvency. This is despite the fact that 
British India, composed of these three states, has a unique place in the history of 
international insolvency law.  
 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, courts in London and Madras saw perhaps the first 
cross-border insolvency protocol between insolvency administrations. The proceedings 
concerned the involuntary liquidation of an Anglo-Indian merchant and banking 
partnership, following the death of one of the partners. The insolvency administrators in 
London and Madras had to respectively collect, realize and distribute assets to English 
and Indian creditors respectively. To do this efficaciously, the London and Madras 
trustees came to an agreement on admitted claims and promised that surplus sums 
would be remitted to the other proceedings for a global distribution. This agreement was 
confirmed by both London and Madras courts and when one English creditor sought to 
challenge the arrangement, the English court stated that the agreement was ‘clearly a 
proper and common-sense business arrangement’ and that it was ‘manifestly for the 
benefit of all parties interested.’62 
 
Sadly, such a spirit of cross-border civil cooperation does not continue to prevail in 
India or its neighbouring states. Instead, a rudimentary framework for dealing with 
cross-border insolvency cases exists in all three countries which broadly reflect a 
territorial approach. Local courts can wind up
63
 the subsidiaries of offshore companies 
incorporated within their jurisdiction or unregistered foreign companies which have 
                                                 
62
 In re P. Macfadyen & Co. Ex parte Vizianagaram Co., Ltd. [1908] 1 K.B. 675. 
63
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places of business there.
64
 This winding up process can occur in parallel to foreign 
insolvency proceedings or even after the parent company has been liquidated in another 
country.
65
 Pakistan’s law additionally requires written notice to be given in Pakistan if a 
foreign company is being liquidated at its registered seat.
66
 Thus, as with many other 
developing countries, the effect of insolvency proceedings in these states extend only to 
foreign debtors who have some form of operation and assets within their jurisdiction.
67
 
Though none of the states draw a distinction between domestic and foreign creditors in 
their company law with regard to preferential payments, Bangladesh’s bankruptcy law 
creates scope for local banks and financial institutions to be prioritised before foreign 
secured creditors in the event a corporation enters bankruptcy.
68
 These countries have 
courts dedicated to corporate insolvency and Bangladesh has ‘Speedy Money Loan 
Courts’ (Artha Rin Adalat) but as such cases are generally treated with the same 
standards as other civil proceedings, these avenues are not cost-effective or efficient.  
 
There is limited possibility for foreign bankruptcy judgments to be recognised in these 
jurisdictions - and for offshore parties to reach assets located in the countries - on the 
basis of legislative reciprocity
69
 or comity.
70
 The case law issuing from these provisions 
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is mixed, with there being evidence that Indian courts are willing to recognise and 
enforce foreign judgments, and even decline anti-suit injunctions if a foreign court is 
exercising proper jurisdiction, while Pakistani courts have more restrictively construed 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
71
 Nonetheless, due to these partial, basic provisions, 
the Asian Development Bank found India and Pakistan to be ‘partially compliant’ with 
Good Practice Standard No. 16 in 2000.
72
 
 
In line with such a territorial stance, the law in these countries has long been silent 
regarding the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and practitioners. No 
foreign court can declare companies registered in these jurisdictions as being liquidated 
abroad and on the same grounds, the insolvency law of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
is not usually given extraterritorial effect. This has not been helped by a requirement 
that the winding-up of foreign companies, that do not have local registered offices, have 
to be done through liquidators or receivers appointed by a local court or tribunal.
73
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The difficulties in organizing cross-border insolvency proceedings in these countries 
has been compounded by judicial inexperience and lack of training in handling complex 
corporate insolvencies, an absence of well-qualified insolvency practitioners, procedural 
encumbrances and regular adjournments, which has meant that it takes years to realize 
debts, sell assets and distribute proceeds to creditors. This is not only prejudicial to 
creditors, both domestic and foreign, but also stymies foreign direct investment and 
undermines companies that may have the possibility of being rehabilitated. These 
economic considerations influenced the passage of India’s consolidated Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Code 2016 but as elaborated in section 7.2.3. below, this has had a limited 
impact on facilitating the coordination of cross-border insolvency procedures and the 
country’s legal regime remains territorial in scope. 74       
 
To address the challenges posed by territorial systems, a range of ‘solutions’ have been 
developed, from CBIAs/protocols to regional agreements to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
 
5. Patchwork of Approaches to Cross-Border Insolvency 
5.1. Protocols 
In the past, cross-border insolvency issues regarding mutual recognition, cooperation 
and assistance were addressed by applying the private international law principle of 
comity or through bilateral insolvency treaties between states. Given the discretionary 
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nature of comity and the small number of countries that have entered into such treaties, 
this practice is considered to be outdated.
75
 
 
Another practice involved setting out an agreement between insolvency administrators 
and/or courts on how certain procedural matters should be handled. These agreements, 
or ‘protocols’, as they have come to be known, can contain provisions on how hearings 
can be coordinated, how claim filing can be processed, how the sale and recovery of 
assets for creditors could be handled and even choice of law issues. 
 
As the multi-state insolvency of, inter alia, Maxwell Communications Corporation plc
76
, 
Re EverFresh Beverages, Inc.
77
 and In Re Joseph Nakash
78
 have demonstrated, 
protocols can help reduce the time it takes to complete insolvency proceedings and 
maximise returns to global creditors.
79
 By focusing on how parties are to conduct 
insolvency proceedings in practice, certain conflict of law issues are side-stepped. As 
the emphasis is upon parties entering into an agreement, concerns about reciprocity, 
sovereignty and respect for comity are obviated. 
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Additionally, this pragmatic approach allows protocols to be carefully calibrated to the 
complexity and circumstance of each individual proceeding. For instance, while 
subsidiaries are treated as distinct entities from parent companies in certain 
jurisdictions, entering into protocols helps ensure that one administrator is appointed for 
all entities of a corporate group. For those interested in entering into such agreements in 
the future, a corpus of soft law instruments and landmark protocols have emerged that 
can provide guidance on how such agreements can be negotiated.  
 
Importantly, entering into a Protocol evinces the concerned parties’ intent to cooperate – 
an intention that may not be present even if the Model Law is enacted and is most 
crucial in ensuring a successful insolvency proceeding.  
 
As an overlapping development, regional blocs like the EU and OHADA have entered 
into multilateral legal frameworks that resolve many of the challenges of intra-regional 
insolvency proceedings. This issues from a ‘mutual trust in each other’s legal 
systems’.80 
 
5.2. EU and OHADA 
Within the European Union, the EC Regulation no. 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings (EIR), in conjunction with the recently enacted EU Regulation 2015/848 
on Insolvency Proceedings (recast) (hereinafter EIR (recast)),
81
 ensures automatic 
recognition and enforcement of judgments concerning insolvency proceedings,
82
 allows 
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a recognised foreign insolvency administrator (liquidator) to open,
83
 stay,
84
 or access 
secondary proceedings and transfer assets out of the member state in favour of main 
proceedings,
85
 generally embraces all the debtor’s assets in the member states, assures 
coordination and communication between primary and secondary liquidators
86
 and 
guarantees the individual notification of all known creditors.
87
 
 
The EIR goes beyond procedural matters to providing a substantive framework for 
transnational insolvency. It defines which proceedings the regulation will be applicable 
to and who can commence it by including Annexes A to C.
88
 While this has not entirely 
dispelled confusion over whether foreign insolvency proceedings exist,
89
 especially due 
to differences in national language and law, it still gives informative guidance to 
national courts. The Regulation also contains ‘uniform rules on conflict of law’,90 
pursuant to which the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has developed a rich vein of 
case law. For instance, the Regulation defines the debtor’s ‘centre of main interests’ 
(COMI) to be where he ‘conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis 
and is therefore ascertainable by third parties’. 91  Ascertaining COMI allows the 
determination of where main insolvency proceedings are to be held and in turn 
pinpoints where all the debtor’s assets should be coordinated from. 92  
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 When all of the provisions of the recast EIR come into force in 2017, it will improve the 
wording of the EIR, include pre-insolvency procedures in the definition of insolvency 
proceedings through a new Annex A, refine the definition of COMI to reduce the 
possibility of forum shopping,
93
 tighten the scope for opening secondary insolvency 
proceedings, mandate cross-border judicial cooperation
94
 and strengthen the capacity of 
the EIR to deal with the insolvencies of a group of companies by including the concept 
of ‘group coordination proceedings’ 95  that will give the court first seized of an 
insolvency application the right to accept jurisdiction and open proceedings. 
 
The regulations do not govern how EU countries are to handle cross-border insolvency 
proceedings with non-EU states, which has led to certain countries like the UK, 
Romania, Slovenia, Greece and Poland to adopt the Model Law while others, like 
Germany, have chosen to reform their domestic legislation in a manner so as to extend 
the effect of the provisions related to the law applicable (articles 4-15 of the EIR) to 
‘any state of the world’.96 
 
Reflecting, and perhaps extending on such developments, OHADA has promulgated a 
series of trans-national business laws to replace existing national laws, one of which is 
the Uniform Act Organising Collective Proceedings for Wiping Off Debts 1999.
97
 The 
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‘recast’ Uniform Act. The Act further clarifies certain insolvency concepts, creates pre-
insolvency conciliation procedures, implements simplified bankruptcy procedures for 
smaller companies, clearly delineates creditors’ rights, furnishes fresh cash 
contributions for companies facing financial difficulties and establishes a legal 
framework for insolvency practitioners.
98
 In this way, OHADA has also complied with 
many of the guidelines of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. The 
more elaborate provisions were needed because of OHADA’s underdeveloped cross-
border insolvency regime and the ‘many grey areas that need to be defined’99 for there 
to be harmonisation and equal treatment of creditors. Admittedly, the fact that the 17 
OHADA states are French speaking, share a legal heritage and can see the assistance of 
a common court in interpreting the Articles of the Act, provides fertile ground for cross-
border judicial cooperation and harmonised interpretation of the law. 
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The liquidation of Air Afrique in 2002 demonstrates the strength of the OHADA 
regime. Air Afrique was an airlines owned by 11 of the OHADA states, Air France, the 
French Development Agency and three private stakeholders. From 1993 onwards, it 
began experiencing financial difficulties due to poor management and unfavourable 
airbus lease agreement. Though a deal was negotiated with Air France regarding 
restructuring its ownership, by 2002 the airline had ‘zero aircraft, over 4000 staff on its 
payroll, had run out of cash and had no lines of credit available’.100 On 7 February 2002 
Air Afrique filed for bankruptcy in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. It had outstanding claims of 
US$ 458 million. The Court in Abidjan decided to order the liquidation of the airlines 
and pursuant to Article 247 of the Uniform Act, it became binding on all contracting 
states and secondary liquidation proceedings were opened in all the states where Air 
Afrique had establishments.
101
 
 
Generally, the need for such regional insolvency regimes is predicated on a high volume 
of regional business activity. For instance, is estimated that 200,000 EU businesses face 
insolvency each year, out of which 50,000 of them have creditors in other Member 
States.
102
 Intra-regional trade in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 
stands at the disproportionately low figure of US$ 3 billion and efforts for achieving 
substantial economic cooperation between contracting states or harmonising 
commercial laws and procedures has not been successful.
103
 However, inspiration, in 
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this regard, could be drawn from the OHADA states as low intra-regional trade and 
problems regarding corruption, judicial unpredictability, lengthy procedures and 
difficulties in enforcing judgments has not prevented them from arriving at a cutting-
edge solution to cross-border insolvency that can attract foreign investors and stimulate 
the private sector.
104
 
 
Some headway has been made in cooperation between central banks and finance 
ministries of contracting states and harmonizing banking legislation and procedures
105
 
but to date, the cooperation process has neglected the issue of cross-border insolvency, 
at a regional or international level, so it would seem that a regional arrangement would 
not be feasible in South Asia for the time being.  
 
6. Towards a ‘Model Law’ on Cross-Border Insolvency  
UNCITRAL turned its attention to cross-border insolvency in the early 1990s when its 
Secretariat cautiously expressed the view that issues such as assistance to foreign courts 
and administrators, cross-border co-operation between insolvency representatives and 
courts and equal treatment of creditors were integral to facilitating world trade and 
merited consideration as to whether it could be harmonised.
106
 Through subsequent 
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working groups and colloquiums, it was agreed that the unification of insolvency law 
was not practicable but common rules on the above matters could be agreed upon.
107
 
 
During its 28
th
 session, UNCITRAL decided to develop a legal instrument on cross-
border insolvency under the aegis of a Working Group. Working Group V was 
composed of all the then 36 Member States
108
 and during its Eighteenth to Twenty-First 
sessions, where the Model Law was deliberated upon and drafted, the BRICS and a 
number of Asian, African and South American countries were represented. Notably, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan were observers in the Twenty First session, while India 
participated as a member state in all sessions.
109
 
 
The Model Law was subsequently approved by the General Assembly on 15 December 
1997
110
 and it is clear from the summary records of the time that the delegations of 
India, Russia and China
111
 were in favour of the spirit of the Model Law. Others, like 
Brazil, sponsored the Resolution outright. The Model Law was followed by a  ‘Guide to 
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Enactment’,112 to assist the legislators of countries interested in adopting the Model Law 
to customise it for local conditions, and a ‘Judicial Perspective’113 to provide assistance 
to judges with questions arising from the application of the Model Law. 
 
The Model Law itself is a short document, composed of only 32 articles. Its scope is 
limited to instances where assistance is sought by a foreign court or representative in 
connection with a foreign proceeding or where a foreign creditor or other stakeholder 
seeks to open local insolvency proceedings or where there are concurrent proceedings 
regarding the same debtor.
114
 Unlike the EC Regulation and the Uniform Act, it does 
not address choice of law issues, but does assure a minimum level of protection to 
foreign creditors by requiring that they have a priority rank of at least a local general 
unsecured creditor
115
 and receive notification of the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings.
116
 
 
States that adopt the Model Law allow foreign representatives to directly access their 
courts to commence or join insolvency proceedings and empowers courts to grant 
recognition and relief to foreign insolvency proceedings, taking place at the debtor’s 
COMI or place of establishment.
117
 This is subject to jurisdictional and public policy 
requirements as well as a need for the court to protect the interests of ‘creditors and 
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other interested persons, including the debtor’.118 If recognition is granted, there is a 
presumption that the debtor is insolvent and an immediate stay becomes effective 
against the commencement of individual creditor actions as well as transfer of, and 
execution against, debtors’ assets.119 The recognising court can additionally pass orders 
for the discovery of documents,
120
 to allow foreign representatives to control local 
assets, to give effect to foreign restructuring plans
121
 and even send assets overseas to 
distribute in the main proceedings.
122
 While relief is granted on a discretionary basis,
123
 
recognition is routinely granted to proceedings and practitioners from enacting states. 
One of the key provisions of the Model Law is that courts and insolvency practitioners 
are required to cooperate to the ‘maximum extent possible’ 124  with their foreign 
counterparts through the appropriate communication of information, coordination of the 
administration of the debtors’ assets and concurrent proceedings and through the 
implementation of protocols.
125
 Guidance for such agreements may be gleaned from an 
array of resources, such as the ALI/III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court 
Communication in Cross-Border Cases and the UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-
Border Insolvency Agreements, which inter alia suggest communication through 
written correspondence, telephone exchanges, etc. 
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However, it is important to note that the aforementioned sections do not preclude 
individual actions to be taken to ‘preserve a claim against a debtor’ or for concurrent 
insolvency proceedings to be commenced after recognition of foreign proceedings, if 
they are necessary to implement coordination and cooperation between courts and 
insolvency practitioners.
126
 
 
It is therefore apparent that this Model Law, unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration or the recently-adopted UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Secured Transactions, is primarily a procedural framework erected upon the 
substantive insolvency laws of enacting states. Moreover, to reach an arrangement 
acceptable to both territorial and universalist systems, enacting states have been given 
the choice to omit provisions of the Model Law. While the more recent UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide (2004) provides recommendations and benchmarks for an effective 
national insolvency law, it cannot be directly incorporated, and till now, there is no 
uniform, substantive international insolvency law.  
 
7. Prospects and Challenges of Adopting the Model Law 
This section will, in two parts, highlight how its implementation has been chequered, 
with some countries utilising its provisions to great effect and others compromising its 
beneficial qualities through questionable amendments.  
 
7.1. Prospects 
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Countries like the USA and Australia incorporated the Model Law in its entirety and in 
some instances, went above and beyond the requirements of the Model Law.
127
 For 
example, the definition of ‘foreign proceeding’ in the USA includes ‘debt adjustment’ 
of companies, not just formal insolvency procedures, and its courts can grant a greater 
variety of relief. The US version of the Model Law makes it possible for one examiner 
to act on behalf of the estate in foreign administrations, which may be crucial in the 
insolvencies of corporate groups with multiple main and non-main proceedings in 
different jurisdictions,
128
 as well as incorporated elements of the ALI Guidelines. Its 
courts also embraced the Model Law. One empirical study found that there was a 96% 
rate of Chapter 15 cases being recognised (i.e. inbound recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings),
129
 with public policy and jurisdictional grounds for refusal 
being construed very strictly.
130
 In a similar vein, the Australian judicial system has 
been active in issuing practice notes concerning cross-border judicial cooperation
131
 and 
has entered into Memorandums of Understanding with the courts of Singapore, New 
York State and the Dubai International Finance Centre Court regarding cooperation on 
interpreting foreign law.
132
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accessed 10 September 2016. 
One example of the beneficial qualities of implementing the Model Law can be seen 
with the rehabilitation proceedings of Samsun Logix Corporation, a South Korean 
shipping company with transnational operations that suffered sharp losses as a result of 
the 2008 Recession. On 6 February 2009, it filed for a rehabilitation order, which was 
granted on 6 March 2009. The Korean court also appointed a representative to manage 
the company’s affairs and allowed them to carry out activities abroad in relation to the 
insolvency proceeding. Within 6 days, an English court recognised the Korean 
insolvency as the foreign main insolvency proceeding and granted additional relief (i.e. 
stay against enforcement of security) with Australia and the USA quickly following suit 
on 17 April 2009 and 21 April 2009 respectively. Similarly, in the recent case of MtGox 
Co., Ltd (Re), the Japanese liquidator of the world’s largest online bitcoin exchange 
successfully gained recognition in an Ontario court that the Japanese bankruptcy was 
the foreign main proceeding and this led to the stay of class-action suits filed in 
Canada.
133
 
 
These cases demonstrate one of the strongest features of the Model Law: as a straight-
forward scheme that allows ancillary proceedings to support one main proceeding by 
expeditiously recognising foreign representatives, granting ancillary relief and treating 
foreign creditors fairly and non-discriminatorily. At the same time, it highlights that the 
differences in substantive insolvency law between South Korea (or Japan) and common 
law countries is not an obstacle for recognition and cooperation, especially when all the 
concerned parties have enacted the Model Law. An empirical study from 2011 indicates 
that enacting states are highly willing to grant recognition (95% of 195 cases across 8 
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countries) and grant ancillary relief (60% of 186 applications across 8 countries).
134
 
Recent case law also suggests that such courts are more open to recognising 
proceedings and giving access to representatives – even when they come from 
jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Law.
135
 
 
Many countries with territorialist regimes suffer from a ‘race of the swiftest’ when 
insolvency proceedings are commenced, by filing for provisional relief and seeking the 
attachment of the debtor’s assets, a problem that is ameliorated by the Model Law. It 
protects a foreign creditor or representative from having to fully submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court in which it files for recognition while also protecting local 
parties through the safeguards in Articles 6, 21 and 22.  
 
More generally, as the Model Law doesn’t require considerable changes to the 
substantive law of a state, there is scope for wide global adoption. The versatility of the 
framework is reflected in the variety of economies, from the USA to Vanuatu, that have 
adopted the Law. For smaller or more economically fragile countries, the cross-border 
cooperation provisions of the Model Law may assist in dealing with international fraud 
and could place them in good standing with IFIs that have explicitly endorsed the 
Model Law.
136
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It is for these reasons that countries like Kenya adopted the Model Law
137
 and 
Singapore is actively considering it.
138
 It has been argued that the absence of such a 
regime has made it difficult for Singaporean insolvency practitioners to carry out 
judicial management orders when the assets were located abroad.
139
 Instead, in the event 
of large-scale transnational insolvencies like Lehman Brothers, a protocol needed to be 
drafted to coordinate proceedings so as to avoid litigation between affiliated entities.
140
 
 
7.2. Drawbacks 
Given the number of advantages of adopting the Model Law, it may reasonably be 
asked: why have countries like Brazil, China, India and Russia not embraced it? 
 
7.2.1. Definitional Uncertainties and Gaps 
Firstly, there are uncertainties that exist with regard to the definitions of the Model Law. 
One definition that has caused particular difficulty in interpretation is ‘foreign 
proceeding’. The Model Law’s rebuttable presumption that the debtor’s COMI is at 
their registered office can lead to more than one court opening what, in their view, is a 
main proceeding and refusing to recognise the other proceedings. While cross-border 
cooperation is encouraged for just such an eventuality, by the time the foreign 
representatives and courts have coordinated the two proceedings, the domestic creditors 
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may have dissipated some of the debtor’s assets. 141 As of now, there are two 
predominant schools of thought regarding COMI, with Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd. and 
Stanford suggesting that the presumption of a debtor’s COMI of registered office will 
only be rebutted if there are factors, objective and ascertainable to third parties, that 
would establish a different situation exists.
142
 On the other hand, it has been suggested 
that this is a misreading of Article 8 of the Model Law and the course that should be 
followed is the one adopted by the US in Chapter 15 proceedings like Hertz where the 
‘nerve center’ test was used.143 The nerve center is considered to be ‘the place where a 
corporation’s officers direct, control and coordinate the corporation’s activities’.144 This 
test shifts the burden of proof onto the foreign representative to prove COMI is at the 
debtor’s registered office, if there is even some evidence that it is not.145 Countries that 
seek to enact the Model Law will have to make a choice among the different approaches 
to follow.  
 
The recent amendment of the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law has been criticised 
for muddying the water further. Its support for the registered office presumption does 
not clarify how factors such as ‘location of the debtor’s books and records’ will help 
ascertain the location of COMI and creates confusion regarding the time at which 
COMI should be determined – at the time the foreign insolvency proceeding is 
recognised or when the insolvency proceeding was first opened.
146
 Furthermore, the 
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current definition is unhelpful in determining the COMI of corporate groups as each of 
its entities has a separate registered office and the possibility of forum-shopping 
remains alive.
147
 
 
7.2.2. Questionable Modification of the Model Law 
A closer look at enacting legislation reveals discrepancies that hamper the harmonised 
interpretation of the Model Law. Its scope has been limited in some countries to 
selected insolvency proceedings, like reorganisations in Canada,
148
 or is exclusive of 
certain entities, like credit institutions in the UK. States such as Poland did not include 
the definitions set out in the Model Law, opting in favour of interpretations based on 
domestic insolvency law. This goes against the stipulation of the Legislative Guide that 
courts should not refer to any particular national system of law. 
 
Countries like South Africa weakened the effect of the Model Law by including an 
additional provision that the Act only applies to states that accord reciprocal treatment 
to South African insolvency law and have been explicitly designated as such by their 
Minister of Justice.
149
To date, no country has been recognised and a procedural 
stalemate has been created, though this could potentially be overcome once a new 
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unified Insolvency Bill is passed.
150
 Similar provisions regarding reciprocity exist in 
Mexico,
151
 Romania,
152
 New Zealand,
153
 and the British Virgin Islands.
154
 
 
The granting of relief pursuant to recognition may be pursuant to the furnishing of 
security, as in the USA, or may differ if the foreign insolvency proceeding is main or 
non-main.
155
 A few states like Poland and the UK have also left open the door for 
concurrent proceedings to be commenced without the debtor’s assets being present in 
that jurisdiction.
156
 
 
While cross-border cooperation and coordination is an integral component of the Model 
Law, the UK has made it discretionary and Japan has omitted the provision entirely.
157
 
This has meant that courts have had to take ad hoc approaches to resolving issues like 
questions of foreign law by appointing foreign law experts, deferring to foreign courts 
for the resolution of a foreign law issue or requiring parties to submit to the jurisdiction 
of the foreign court pending determination of the foreign law issue.
158
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Though courts are encouraged to narrowly read the safeguards of the Model Law,
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significantly, courts in states like Canada and Serbia have been granted broader 
discretion regarding refusal of recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings on the 
grounds of public policy than envisioned under the Model Law.
160
 While Canada may 
have a developed practice of cross-border insolvency, this provision may stultify the 
process in Serbia. Experience in other fields of international commercial law, such as 
investor-state arbitration, demonstrate that courts in developing countries often resort to 
public policy justifications to flout the enforcement of arbitration awards.
161
 
 
Some authors have furthermore suggested that the Model Law suffers from not having a 
choice of law provision, as courts applying domestic conflict of law and choice of law 
provisions may favour local creditors.
162
 
 
7.2.3. Addressing Legitimacy  
Along with the substantive concerns regarding the Model Law, one of the criticisms 
targeted at the Model Law has been one of perceived ‘legitimacy’. While UNCITRAL 
and the World Bank set the international standard for insolvency law, perceptions of 
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their legitimacy turn on how representative they are, how procedurally fair their 
deliberations and how effective they are as an organisation.
163
 
 
UNCITRAL’s work is supposed to take into account the ‘interests of all 
peoples…particularly those of the developing countries’ and in some respects, it is a 
representative body.
164
 While Bangladesh has yet to be elected as a member, India was 
one of the first members of UNCITRAL (since 1968) and was included in the 
consultation and drafting process for the Model Law, while Pakistan became a member 
in 2004. India was also involved in the working group that developed the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide and attended 6 out of 8 sessions.
165
 Whether such attendance amounts 
to substantive representation is another matter.  
 
It is unclear from the travaux préparatoires of those sessions the extent to which 
delegates from these countries contributed to the discussions and drafting process, 
however, the dominance of the US delegation is apparent. The US National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission itself stated that ‘over the course of the project [Working Group 
Sessions] the text moved decisively in the directions sought by the United States and by 
the leading NGOs’.166 This issue also arose during the drafting of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, with delegates from Brazil, China, India and Russia attending certain 
Working Group sessions but only 27 delegates attending more than five sessions. These 
27 had a ‘high impact’ on the drafting process and unsurprisingly, they predominantly 
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originate from OECD countries (particularly the USA) and international insolvency 
associations.
167
 
 
The USA has an interest in moulding these instruments in its own image, as it would be 
beneficial to their investors and traders, while IFIs require such reforms to be addressed 
in national poverty reduction strategy papers for funding to be disbursed.
168
 While some 
countries may be willing to compromise on their sovereign system’s priority and 
distribution rights, if it would mean more trade with the USA or improved standing with 
IFIs, those in stronger bargaining positions, such as China and Russia, may not be.
169
 
The Chinese government, for instance, has introduced market access and anti-dumping 
restrictions that favour domestic companies – in stark contrast to prevalent international 
trade practices.
170
 These countries may be more interested in robust changes to their 
domestic insolvency regimes than incorporating a Model Law simply to appear 
commercially attractive. They may also feel that they do not confront a sufficient 
number of cross-border cases that would ‘require immediate, long-term legislative 
solutions of the nature envisioned by the Model Law’.171 The Model Law is not, after 
all, a panacea to deficiencies in domestic insolvency law or court systems. It is notable 
that, as per the World Bank’s Resolving Insolvency rankings, which assesses the 
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strength of respective countries domestic insolvency law, only 13 of the top 40 
countries have adopted the Model Law, while 4 enacting states jointly rank last.
172
 
 
There may also be merit in the suggestion that attrition in enacting the Model Law is 
due to the ‘distance’ between the interests and needs of these states and the objects of 
the Model Law.
173
 This could be exacerbated by cultural, historical and religious factors 
or an absence of support from key local players, such as the business community, 
leading lawyers, top government officials and the judiciary.
174
 
 
7.2.4. The Road to Reform 
It would be difficult to argue that such distance exists between the Model Law and the 
interests of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, as they have market-oriented economies 
and many of their key local players were educated in the UK or the US. In Bangladesh, 
the support of the legal community facilitated the passage of the US Bankruptcy Code-
inspired Bankruptcy Act as well as an Arbitration Act that is in line with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
175
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Similar support hasn’t been extended to the Model Law in Bangladesh, despite cross-
border insolvency becoming a growing issue for Bangladeshi businesses
176
 and foreign 
investors requiring the support of Bangladeshi courts in realising assets from foreign 
insolvency proceedings.
177
 This reluctance may be attributed to Bangladesh’s lack of 
engagement with UNCITRAL, limited awareness about the rising number of cross-
border insolvencies and insufficient international trade law and private international law 
regimes. While there is no indication that the Model Law is under active consideration, 
incremental steps are being taken to professionalize the corporate culture in the country, 
including the introduction of the profession of ‘Chartered Secretary’ to perform services 
to reorganize and wind-up companies
178
 and the digitalization of the winding up 
process.
179
 
 
While there has been a spate of reforms in Pakistan’s insolvency law over the past two 
decades, the onus has been on domestic corporate reorganisation or rehabilitation, 
largely because of an accumulation of non-performing loans over many years.
180
 
Inspiration for these reforms has been drawn from Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code and there has also been discussion of reforming the country’s bankruptcy law in 
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line with Mexico’s insolvency law (2000), a country that has also incorporated the 
Model Law, thus raising the slim possibility that reform concerning cross-border 
insolvency will also be undertaken.
181
 
 
In contrast, in India, a complex picture emerges as there appears to be a disconnect 
between the wishes of the legal community and the government. As early as 1995, a 
senior Indian judge at a Judicial Colloquium remarked that there was a consensus 
among all present that cross-border cooperation, access of foreign representatives and 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings was needed – even though he had 
personal reservations about ex parte communication with other judges.
182
 
More recently, a series of recommendations from the specially-appointed Eradi 
Committee on Law Relating to Insolvency of Companies (2000), the Mitra Advisory 
Group on Bankruptcy (2001) and the Irani Committee on Company Law (2005), also 
called for such reforms and the Model Law to be enacted.
183
 Curiously, there is even an 
example of an Indian lawyer introducing the Model Law as part of their submissions 
against a stay order granted against the execution of a money decree, even though the 
Model Law has not been enacted in India.  
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The case of Sumkin Bussan International vs. King Shing Enterprises Ltd.
184
 concerned 
recognition of a bankruptcy judgment issued by the High Court of Singapore, after an 
order of property attachment had already been granted in India, but the Bombay High 
Court ultimately held that such a judgment could not be recognized as the attachment 
had been ordered well before the bankruptcy judgment. In doing so, the High Court held 
in favour of the appellants and vacated the stay order. It was the successful counsel for 
the appellants who had sought to submit the Model Law but ultimately conceded that it 
is ‘only model law [sic] and not a treaty and, therefore, it has no legal basis in India'.185 
 
Despite the welcoming attitude of the legal community, the Indian Government has 
maintained a lukewarm stance. In the immediate lead-up to the Model Law being tabled 
before the UN General Assembly, India’s head of delegation praised the Model Law as 
being the highlight of the 30
th
 Session of UNCITRAL but added that ‘his Government 
would have to closely examine the provisions of the Model Law in the light of its 
legislation and relevant jurisprudence in order to ensure compatibility with its domestic 
laws’.186 It is significant that India eventually did not sponsor the Model Law when it 
was paced as a Draft Resolution before the General Assembly.  
 
Since then, India’s companies’187 and insolvency legislation has undergone substantial 
reforms. Following Bankruptcy Law Reform Commission (BLRC) reports,
188
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Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016
189
 was enacted. The Code consolidates the laws 
pertaining to corporate insolvencies and it, inter alia, provides improved regulations and 
guidelines for insolvency practitioners, the empowerment of the specialised National 
Company Law Tribunal to adjudicate corporate insolvency matters and a fast-track 
insolvency resolution process. While the reforms did not initially encompass cross-
border issues, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
Code recommended insertion of provisions to reach the foreign assets of Indian firms 
like the now defunct Kingfisher airlines.
190
 It gives insolvency resolution professionals 
nominated by financial creditors or liquidators appointed by the Tribunal the right to 
take control and custody of ‘assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights 
which may be located in a foreign country’, thus potentially empowering them to seek 
recognition of Indian insolvency proceedings abroad.
191
 The Code envisions reaching 
the foreign assets of corporate debtors or their personal guarantors by entering into 
reciprocal agreements with other states
192
 and subsequently issuing letters of requests to 
their courts and authorities for evidence of, or action against, assets located within their 
jurisdiction. This reciprocity requirement is in line with India’s practice concerning 
foreign judgments and goes further towards coordinating cross-border proceedings than 
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the practices in China and Russia. It also opens up the country’s legal system to in-
bound insolvency practitioners and proceedings from reciprocating states, such as, 
potentially, the United States.
193
  
 
However, the choice not to adopt the Model Law during an overhaul of the country’s 
insolvency regimes signals India’s abiding territorialist inclinations. Furthermore, 
aspects of the Code may even be detrimental to foreign parties, as the congealing of 
creditor classes and the short insolvency resolution timeframe (180 or 270 days), may 
lead to damaging, avoidable liquidations.
194
 This is especially as local parties may seek 
to hinder such resolutions and force liquidation through dilatory tactics such as frequent 
adjournments.  
 
Nonetheless, as an encouraging recent development, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India 
ratified the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
2001 in 2006, 2008 and 2008 respectively
195
 and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol in 
2006, 2009 and 2008 respectively.
196
 By doing so they have, inter alia, committed to 
protect (foreign) creditors’ priority rights and claims from the debtor’s insolvency 
administrator. It is notable that all three countries opted for Alternative A under Article 
XI of the Protocol which requires an insolvency administrator within a specified waiting 
period, ‘to cure all defaults and agree to perform all future obligations, failing which the 
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administrator must give the creditor the opportunity to take possession of the aircraft 
object’. 197  This, by its very nature, requires a substantial degree of cross-border 
cooperation and coordination, as well as a measure of access for foreign insolvency 
representatives and creditors. The short waiting period, 30 days for India and 60 days 
for Bangladesh and Pakistan emphasizes that such cooperation between local authorities 
and the insolvency administrator must occur swiftly. Thus, for these countries to be able 
to fully implement its commitments under these instruments, the need for a solid cross-
border insolvency regime becomes even more pressing.  
 
8. The Way Forward 
In view of the above, adopting the Model Law on its own will not establish a solid 
cross-border insolvency regime in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Given the nascent 
professional landscape and lack of political will in India and the state of insolvency law 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan, it would appear that the time is not ripe for these countries 
to adopt the Model Law. This view is shared by India’s BLRC, which stated ‘that 
further thought and consideration is required before implementing the UNCITRAL 
Model Law’.198 As evident from the abovementioned examples of enacting states, the 
Model Law is most effective when built on a solid substantive insolvency law 
framework and other interim measures are needed before the Model Law can be 
adopted as a useful procedural instrument.  
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In the short term, it is imperative that the legislation of Bangladesh and Pakistan be 
reformed to ease the process of corporate insolvency. India has already taken 
commendable steps in this regard through its new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 
Furthermore, steps should be taken so that the court system does not unduly influence 
winding up proceedings in the event that a foreign company that has a place of business 
in their jurisdiction seeks to enter into insolvency proceedings. This could be by 
deleting the provision that unregistered companies cannot be wound up voluntarily or 
adding an exception for foreign companies. While many countries reserve the right to 
commence concurrent proceedings, the language of such sections could be amended to 
reflect a willingness to cooperate with foreign courts and representatives. This would 
have to be complemented with initiatives to train insolvency law practitioners 
familiarise judges with cross-border insolvency practices. The Asian Business Law 
Institute, launched in January 2016, may have a significant role in this regard.
199
 
 
Longer term, local business communities need to become more vocal about the 
challenges posed to them by an inadequate cross-border insolvency regime, so that it 
becomes high on the agenda of policy-level discussions on the modernization of 
insolvency law. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, policy makers could deliberate upon the 
Recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, as India’s BLRC has recently 
done, or draft provisions in accordance with the World Bank Principles.  
 
If cross-border insolvency proceedings arise in the meantime, ad hoc court-to-court 
protocols still present the best option for these three countries as it will allow parties to 
                                                 
199
 Asian Business Law Institute, ‘Introduction’ <http://abli.asia/ABOUT-US/Introduction> accessed 28 
April 2016. 
expeditiously prepare custom agreements.
200
 Drawing from existing guidelines and 
practice standards, these protocols could encourage cooperation and coordination in a 
particular set of circumstances for the efficient recovery of assets for creditors, while 
assuaging policy concerns about sovereignty and the interests of other stakeholders. 
They may also be able to address complex issues regarding group of companies or the 
determination of applicable law.  
 
This may serve as a confidence-building measure in dealing with cross-border 
insolvencies and set these countries on the path towards enacting the Model Law.  
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